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Discourses of Resistance in the
American Revolution
Alex Tuckness
Much of the debate about the political thought of the American Revolution
has centered on the relative influence of the liberal tradition as exemplified by
John Locke and the republican tradition. The tide of recent scholarship has
been against the revisionist position that downplayed the influence of Locke
on the American founding in favor of authors in the republican tradition. One
can grant that Locke was not a hegemonic figure and that republican sources
played an important role without denying Locke’s central place. The real puzzle
for scholars now is the ease with which early American thinkers combined
liberal and republican strands of political thought that many modern scholars
find contradictory.1 In this paper I suggest that to answer this question we must
broaden our scope and recognize that revolutionary thought cannot be placed
along a simple continuum between liberals and republicans. Rather, the argu-
ments the Americans used to justify resistance are better understood as falling
into four types: Lockean, Biblical, legal/historical, and republican. These are
not rigid types but indicators of relative emphasis. Each represents a distinct
way of arguing for resistance, but the American writers did not see them as
mutually exclusive. A survey of American resistance pamphlets reveals that
Lockean themes were very common and that for a number of reasons writers
were able to see Lockean arguments as complementary to the other types. Close
analysis of what Locke actually said and of the types of arguments made in
each of these genres reveals the underlying unity the American writers under-
stood these different modes of discourse to have. Where there were sharp dif-
ferences, the other modes of discourse were often modified in a Lockean direc-
tion.
The thirty-three pamphlets surveyed in this article are drawn from the sev-
enty-two pamphlets in Bernard Bailyn’s projected four-volume series of pam-
phlets of the revolutionary period. He selected the pamphlets on the basis of
Copyright 2004 by Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
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1 See Gordon Wood, “Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America,” William and Mary
Quarterly, 44 (1987), 634.
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relevance, contemporary fame, representativeness, and originality of thought.2
Although there is one sermon from 1750, all other pamphlets in the series were
published between 1760 and 1776. The thirty-three pamphlets represent those
that present conditions under which resistance is legitimate, even if the author
did not believe those conditions existed, and they illustrate how colonists ar-
gued for resistance and combined different types of arguments. This procedure
necessarily calls for judgment in deciding which pamphlets to include and there-
fore the possibility of bias. By using the pamphlets selected by Bailyn, who is
generally thought to have played down the Lockean influence, the selection
procedure should if anything overstate the influence of republican authors.
One important methodological question that must be addressed before pro-
ceeding to the typology is the criteria for inclusion in the study. Since this study
includes pamphlets that present the argument that resistance is sometimes ap-
propriate even if the writer did not think that facts of the current situation war-
ranted resistance,3 some pamphlets by Loyalist writers and writers who did not
support the actual revolution enthusiastically are included in the sample. Two
considerations justify their inclusion. First, many colonists made the decision
to resist only gradually and grudgingly. These “hypothetical resistance” pam-
phlets (to coin a term) provided a necessary intermediate step en route to calls
for actual resistance. It is striking how many of the arguments used to justify
actual resistance were first put forward by persons who were not themselves
advocating resistance. Second, there are also pamphlets that actively argue
against resistance on the grounds not that such resistance is always wrong but
that it was wrong in this particular case. These pamphlets show that in some
cases Lockean vocabulary was present on both sides of the argument.
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to compare this project to pre-
vious contributions to the literature. The works of both Stephen Dworetz and
Jerome Huyler support my findings. Dworetz finds a central place for Locke in
revolutionary thought based on the instances of direct references to Locke and
his texts, as well as instances of content correspondence.4 Dworetz, however,
spends little time showing how the Lockean strand of resistance theory was
2 Bernard Bailyn (ed.), Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1765 (4 vols. [pro-
jected]); Cambridge, Mass., 1965), I, xiii.
3 See Jonathan Mayhew, A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-Resis-
tance to the Higher Powers ... (Boston, 1750) in Bailyn, Pamphlets; The Snare Broken. A Thanks-
giving Discourse. (Boston, 1766), 35. Andrew Eliot, A Sermon Preached Before his Excellency
Francis Bernard, Esq. Governor ... (Boston, 1765), 10, 17, William Hicks, The Nature and
Extent of Parliamentary Power Considered ... (Philadelphia, 1768), xv., and A Serious Address
... Boston-Port Act (New York 1774), 4; also Samuel Seabury, The Congress Canvassed ... (New
York 1774), 24; Jonathan Boucher, A Letter from a Virginian to the Members of the Congress
(New York, 1774), 24-25; and No. 3 The Dougliad. On Liberty ... (New York, 1770), 1.
4 Stephen M. Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American
Revolution (Durham, 1990), 34-37.
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combined with the other modes of argument described above. Huyler’s work
concentrates on showing the coherence of the synthesis of Lockean and repub-
lican themes; my work focuses on a wider typology of types of argument.5
Michael Zuckert’s conclusions are similar to those presented here insofar as
we both claim that Lockean natural rights played a central role in the thought
of the American founding and that other modes of argument were frequently
interpreted in ways congenial to Lockean theory. Zuckert, however, takes the
Declaration of Independence as his point of departure and does not focus on
the earlier resistance pamphlets that led up to it.6 John Dunn’s position is also
compatible with the conclusions that follow, since his claims center primarily
on Locke’s direct influence prior to 1760 and after the American Revolution.7
The present work concentrates on the period between 1760 and 1776 and al-
lows for the possibility that Locke’s influence was largely indirect and that his
theories often reached the colonists secondhand. The study of citation frequency
by Donald Lutz confirms that Locke was cited more often than any other au-
thor in the 1760s and 1770s, but citation tallies alone do not explain how the
modes of discourse were combined with each other.8
While corruption and virtue do form an important part of the Revolution-
ary vocabulary, these themes are not themselves antithetical to Locke, though
the concept of politics as a trust based on compact is difficult to reconcile with
a civic republican reading of the Revolution.9 This study also casts doubt on
the generalization that Cato’s Letters was of equal importance to the Two Trea-
tises as a political authority, at least regarding the issue of resistance.10 Simi-
larly problematic is the assertion that Locke was rarely used with reference to
the dissolution of government.11
5 Jerome Huyler, Locke in America (Lawrence, 1995).
6 Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic (Notre Dame, 1996).
7 John Dunn, “The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century,”
John Locke, Problems and Perspectives, ed. John Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 74-78.
8 Donald Lutz, “The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth Century
American Political Thought,” American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 189-97.
9 Cf. J.G.A Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), ch. 15.
10 See Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.,
1967), 34-35. Since Trenchard and Gordon were not advocates of revolution, this is perhaps
unsurprising.
11 This claim is made by Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic (New York, 1953), 358;
also Joyce Oldham Appleby, “The Social Origins of American Revolutionary Ideology” Journal
of American History, 64 (1978), 935-58; Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism:
The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, 1988);
Ronald Hamowy, “Cato’s Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm,” History of Politi-
cal Thought, 11 (1990), 273-94 and “Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A critique of
Gary Willis’s ‘Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence,’ ” William and Mary
Quarterly, 36 (1979), 503-23; Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeoisie Radicalism:
Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America (Cornell, 1990); Paul Rahe,
Republics Ancient and Modern (Chapel Hill, 1992).
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In the 33 pamphlets surveyed here, Locke was cited more frequently (12
pamphlets, 36%) than any other non-Biblical source and far more than Sidney,
Harrington, or Cato’s Letters each of which was cited 3 times or less. Fifteen
authors use few non-biblical quotations and cite none of the major figures.12 In
such cases their failure to quote Locke is hardly evidence that they were more
influenced by another writer and more likely reflects literary style. Two-thirds
of the remaining eighteen pamphlets quote Locke. Locke’s direct citations tend
to occur between 1766-68 and 1772-74 (ten citations); after the fighting began
in 1775, the revolutionary writers began to change their focus away from resis-
tance theory, and direct invocation of Locke became more rare. It may be that
as other concerns became more pressing, Lockean ideas functioned more as
implicit assumptions than as the main topic of discussion.
Although any typology will be imperfect, it is helpful to differentiate four
modes of argument: Lockean, Biblical, legal/historical, and civic republican.13
The four types of argument do not provide clear, mutually exclusive categories.
Revolutionary authors used all four methods of argument, sometimes in the
same pamphlet. What is most striking is not the tensions between these modes
of argument but the almost complete absence of any recognition on the part of
American authors that there was a tension in need of resolution. My goal is
decidedly not to try to force the pamphlets into a rigid typology. Although I
emphasize the Lockean elements in the pamphlets, I also emphasize the way
pamphleteers combined these forms of argument in the same pamphlet. The
groupings are illustrative rather than definitive. Some of the pamphlets fit quite
easily into more than one category, illustrating the lack of tension between the
categories. Some pamphlets do not fit the criteria because of the literary style in
which they were written.14 Others are not discussed because the right of revolu-
tion appears more as a premise than as something to be defended.15 Pamphlets
illustrating each of the four themes are discussed in turn.
A Lockean argument for resistance will generally focus on the claims that:
natural rights, especially the right to life, liberty, and property, exist regardless
of the existence of any positive law; government must be by consent, especially
when questions of property and taxation are at stake; government is a trust and
12 None of these authors cited Locke, Coke, Blackstone, Harrington, Sidney, Cato’s Letters,
or Montesquieu.
13 Cf. Barry, The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American
Political Thought (Princeton, 1994), 25-26, and Michael Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic.
14 In particular Alexander Martin, America. A Poem ... To Which Is Added Liberty. A Poem.
By Rusticus ... (Philadelphia, 1769?), 17 and the anonymous A Ministerial Catechise ... (Boston
1771), 6.
15 See Charles Lee, Strictures on a Pamphlet, Entitled, A “Friendly Address to All Reason-
able Americans [”] ... (New London, 1775), 4; Carter Braxton, An address to the Convention of
... Virginia; on the Subject of Government ... (Philadelphia, 1776), 3-4; The Genuine Principles
of the Ancient Saxon, or English Constitution ... (Philadelphia, 1776), 3; and Thomas Paine,
Common Sense ... (Philadelphia, 1776), 4.
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that, therefore, representation is an adequate (and possibly preferable) substi-
tute for direct personal participation in politics; and resistance is legitimate if
the government betrays its trust by systematically failing to protect rights or
promote the public good. Lockean writers may also make explicit reference to
the idea of a state of nature and may view the act of resistance as an “appeal to
heaven.”16 Although not all of these ideas are unique to Locke, they do form a
body of thought that taken together represents a distinctive way of arguing for
resistance.
The Rights of the British Colonies by James Otis is an important example
of Lockean justification for resistance. His muted radicalism is also an ex-
ample of why writers who did not actually call for resistance are of crucial
importance to the present study. He presented Lockean resistance theory in
relatively full form at an early stage, yet steadfastly denied he was challenging
the authority of Parliament. In discussing the origins of government, he di-
rected those who would raise endless questions about the doctrine of compact
to “consult Mr. Locke’s discourses on government.”17 Otis attacked despotism
and affirmed that in civil society there must be a sovereign power “from whose
final decisions there can be no appeal but directly to Heaven.”18 The supreme
power is ultimately in the people and government is a “trust” which pursues
their good. Quoting Locke, he argued that absolute monarchy must lead to
slavery.19 Again citing Locke, he argued that the people will bear much before
resisting, but that the power of a people facing enslavement is “irresistible.”20
He went on to quote large sections of the Second Treatise that deal with the
way in which altering the legislative power or violating the trust dissolves the
government, the principle that property can only be taken by consent, and the
concept that the people retain the right to resume their original liberty if the
government fails to protect their lives, liberties and estates.21 He later quoted
Locke’s comments on the nature of liberty and equality and in opposition to
slavery.22 Citing chapter eleven of the Second Treatise, he noted that the gov-
ernment is obliged to govern by stated laws for the good of the people, that
taxation can only be by consent, and that the legislative power is non-transfer-
able.23
16 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988), 2.4, 6,
22, 134, 142, 155-56, 222, 225.
17 James Otis, “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,” Pamphlets, ed.
Bernard Bailyn (Boston, 1764), 421.
18 Ibid., 424.
19 Ibid., Cf. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1.1.
20 Ibid., 429. Cf. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 2.223.
21 Ibid., 434-35.
22 Ibid., 440. Cf. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 2.4, 2.22.
23 Ibid., 446.
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Otis’s extensive use of Locke may have provided a means of popularizing
Locke to Americans who were not familiar with him in 1764, before the situa-
tion between Britain and the colonies intensified. If Dunn’s claim is correct
regarding the relative obscurity of the Two Treatises in the early part of the
century, Otis’s presentation would provide an explanation for the subsequent
popularization of Locke. There are only a few subsequent pamphlets that use
Lockean arguments other than those present in Otis’s pamphlet, so it is unclear
whether Otis inspired thorough or merely cursory reading of Locke’s political
theory. Otis supplemented Lockean theory with extensive arguments from En-
glish law, trying to bolster the natural rights claims with justifications from
legal sources.
In 1765 Otis published a defense of his 1764 pamphlet that had been, un-
derstandably, accused of radicalism. In his Vindication the tension within his
thought was even more pronounced than in the earlier pamphlet. He did not
repudiate his earlier resistance theory and continued to cite Locke, but none-
theless argued that the “Parliament of Great Britain hath a just, clear, equitable,
and constitutional right, power, and authority to bind the colonies by all acts
wherein they are named.”24
A 1766 pamphlet by Richard Bland contains a novel use of Locke that was
not present in Otis. He cited Locke and argued that in a state of nature all are
free and independent; society is created by consent. He then drew on the Lockean
claim that there is a natural right of persons to emigrate and remove themselves
from society.25 When the colonists immigrated to America, they reclaimed their
natural freedom and now could create a sovereign, independent state and nego-
tiate binding charters and compacts.26 He used the example of a robber to illus-
trate that conquest gives no political rights, and argued that taking property by
force creates a “State of War.”27 Natural rights bind the powers of parliament,
and if the parliament oversteps this boundary, the first recourse would be to
peacefully seek settlement. A continued “Denial of Justice” can excuse break-
ing the public peace.28 These statements are very similar in content to Locke’s
argument in the Second Treatise. Ideas associated with Lockean discourse, such
as natural rights, the state of nature, the social contract, and an appeal to heaven,
were present in the thought of many of the writers.29
24 James Otis, “A Vindication of the British Colonies, against the Aspersions of the Halifax
Gentleman, in His Letter to a Rhode Island Friend,” Pamphlets, ed. Bailyn (Boston, 1765), 555.
25 Richard Bland, An Inquiry Into the Rights of the British Colonies, Intended as an Answer
to [‘] The Regulations Lately Made[’] ... (Williamsburg, 1766), 9-10.
26 Ibid., 14-15.
27 Ibid., 24-25.
28 Ibid., 26-27.
29 See also Andrew Eliot, A Sermon Preached Before his Excellency Francis Bernard, Esq.
Governor ... (Boston, 1765), 8, 10, 17-18, 30, 35, 42; William Hicks, The Nature and Extent of
Parliamentary Power Considered, xv, 2 and Considerations upon the Rights of the Colonists to
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Biblical arguments here refer to interpretations of the Bible used to support
resistance, most notably by claiming resistance was not a sin. Some writers
even argued that resistance to tyranny was a Christian duty. During the Revolu-
tionary War itself, preachers often reassured the colonists that God would cause
them to prevail. The pamphleteers drew on a wide variety of Biblical texts.
Jonathan Mayhew interpreted Romans 13 as commanding obedience to the
king who punishes evil and rewards good but not the tyrant who punishes good
and rewards evil. Christians are subject to the government like everyone else,
but like everyone else they still may throw off the yoke of a tyrant.30 This gloss
on the passage was common among colonial preachers. Another popular argu-
ment was that the use of government force must be appropriate in some cases
because John the Baptist instructed soldiers to act justly and be content with
their pay, not to leave their profession because it was necessarily sinful.31 The
colonists often appropriated the Old Testament, for example, appealing to the
book of Esther. Like the Americans, the Israelites were in danger of being
destroyed. If the king could take one shilling of their property without consent
he could take everything. When Esther interceded with the king for her people,
she did not obtain a revocation of the decree that commanded the Israelites be
attacked. Rather, the Israelites were merely allowed to use weapons to defend
themselves, a right they had by nature anyway. The people prayed for God to
deliver them from their oppressors and he did so by aiding them in battle. The
author derived lessons from this about how the colonists should respond to
England.32 Their battle against England was an appeal to heaven.
Locke made it so easy for persons to combine Biblical arguments with his
own philosophical arguments that he did much of the work for them. Locke
spilled considerable ink trying to show that his positions were consistent with
the Bible. This aim dominates the First Treatise, and his explication of Ro-
mans 13 in his Paraphrases on the Epistles of St. Paul is almost identical to the
the Privileges of British Subjects ...  (New York, 1766), 16; A Serious Address ... Boston Port
Act, 4; Stephen Johnson, Some Important Observations ... (Newport, 1766), 10-11, 18-23; Silas
Downer, A Discourse ... At the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty ... (Providence, 1768), 5, 14;
The Votes and Proceedings of the Freeholders ... of ... Boston ... (Boston, 1772), 2-6, 10, 33; The
Speeches of ... Governor Hutchinson to the General Assembly ... With the Answers of His Majesty’s
Council and the House of Representatives Respectively ... (Boston, 1773), 90, 111-12; Philip
Livingston, The Other Side of the Question ... in Answer to a Late Friendly Address to All
Reasonable Americans ... (New York, 1774), 12-13; John Allen, An Oration on the Beauties of
Liberty ... (Boston 1773), VI-XIII, 66ff and The American Alarm, or the Bostonian Plea, for the
Rights, and Liberties, of the People ... (Boston, 1773), 6-8; John Carmichael, A Self-Defensive
War Lawful . . . (Lancaster, Pa., 1775), 9-12; Moses Mather, America’s Appeal to the Impartial
World ... (Hartford, 1775), 5-6, 95.
30 Mayhew, A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission.
31 Carmichael, A Self-Defensive War Lawful.
32 Oliver Noble, Some Strictures upon the ... Book of Ester, Shewing the Power and Oppres-
sion of State Ministers ... (Newburyport, 1775).
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interpretation that Mayhew presented in 1750.33 Although the similarity does
not prove that Locke was Mayhew’s source, we do know that Mayhew had
some familiarity with Locke’s thought. Mayhew referred to Locke explicitly on
the question of liberty in a 1766 sermon.34 This later sermon maintained the
right of resistance, but emphasized that the current conditions did not warrant
such action. Locke’s theistic presentation of natural law also made it very straight-
forward to combine those claims with biblical ones. If one takes Locke’s reli-
gious claims at face value as the pamphleteers generally did, then it is
unsurprising that they saw Lockean and Biblical modes of argument as comple-
mentary.35
Zuckert has argued for an even stronger thesis. He claims that there is con-
siderable discontinuity between earlier Puritan theology and a rather secular
Lockean theory of natural rights.36 It is not so much that the two positions ar-
rived at the same conclusion as that “To put the issue bluntly and perhaps too
starkly … I am arguing for a Lockean conquest, or at least assimilation, of
Puritan thought.”37 His clear implication is that the move toward Lockean natu-
ral rights is a move toward secularism insofar as it reveals the priority of nature
and reason over the Bible and revelation. Just as I argue below that republican-
ism was modified to fit within a Lockean framework, so Zuckert claims that
Christianity was modified to fit within a Lockean framework.
There is much in Zuckert’s work that is consistent with the present analy-
sis, for example, that on the most important theological issue for the present
purposes, the legitimacy of revolution, the colonists interpreted Romans 13
more like Locke did than like Luther did. That is, resistance pamphleteers did
adopt a theology remarkably consistent with Lockean natural law. By itself this
might merely indicate a shift from one version of Protestantism to another.
Whether one views this shift as a shift toward secularism depends largely on
how one views Locke’s theory of natural law. If one takes it to be quite secular,
as Zuckert does, then one reaches the conclusion that allowing natural law to
help interpret the Bible is a move toward secularism. If on the other hand one
thinks Locke’s natural law doctrine was itself deeply intertwined with Chris-
tian theology, there is little reason to see the change as an intentional move
toward secularism. I have argued elsewhere that Locke’s natural law theory is
more coherent than is often thought if it is understood in this second way.38 We
33 John Locke, A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul to the Galatians, 1 and 2
Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians (Vol. 2), ed. Arthur Wainwright (Oxford, 1987), Romans
13; See Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine, 157 ff.
34 Mayhew, The Snare Broken, 35.
35 See Oliver Noble’s Some Strictures upon the ... Book of Ester.
36 See The Natural Rights Republic, 148-201.
37 Ibid., 172; and cf. Dworitz, The Unvarnished Doctrine.
38 Alex Tuckness, “The Coherence of a Mind: John Locke and the Law of Nature,” Journal
of the History of Philosophy, 37 (1999), 73-90.
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should not necessarily assume that natural law arguments and scriptural argu-
ments stand in, or were understood by the Pamphleteers to stand in, direct
competition with one another. Explicit references to the primacy of reason over
revelation were rare in these pamphlets.
The legal/historical mode of argument attempted to show that Americans
were entitled by positive law and tradition to the full rights of British subjects
and that the forces of tyranny were seeking to deprive them of those rights.39
For example, a common claim was that historically all Englishmen had a right
to be taxed only by the consent of parliament and that, therefore, a denial of
representation was also a denial of legal rights. Colonists often cited from the
texts of statutes and charters, as well as the writings of jurists like Coke and
Blackstone, to make their case. Colonists could also refer to episodes in En-
glish history, such as the Glorious Revolution with which Locke is so closely
associated, where resistance was generally recognized as legitimate, and try to
show analogies to the current situation. When David Hume was invoked, it was
more often as an historian than a philosopher. Richard Bland argued that the
right of persons to be taxed only in cases where they had given consent could
be traced to the ancient Saxon constitution.40 Here he uses a historical argu-
ment to supplement the natural law argument that property may not be taken
without consent.
Although Locke’s arguments were in one sense both radical and ahistorical,
the timing of their publication made them seem much less so. The Glorious
Revolution prompted Locke to publish the previously written Two Treatises as
a justification for that revolution.41 Because Locke’s argument was seen as
justifying a historical event that most citizens on both sides of the Atlantic
regarded as legitimate, it was possible for later writers to appeal to the histori-
cal precedents surrounding the Glorious Revolution as justification for Ameri-
can resistance. Because Locke’s Two Treatises was read as a defense of the
status quo, and because many Lockean rights were recognized in the law after
the Glorious Revolution, it was very easy for later writers to claim that English
legal tradition and Lockean theory came to the same conclusions. Joseph
Emerson’s sermon of 1766 made this connection explicit. Writing after the
repeal of the Stamp Act, he noted that the attempt at taxation without consent
was an attempt at slavery that justified resistance to that act and did so by
comparing American resistance to the Glorious Revolution.42 He claimed that
Americans had joined in the rebellion against James II and that the resistance
39 See Maurice Moore, The Justice and Policy of Taxing the American Colonies, in Great
Britain, Considered ... (Wilmington, N.C., 1765); Hicks, Considerations upon the Rights of the
Colonists; and Joseph Emerson, A Thanksgiving-Sermon preach’d at Pepperall ... (Boston 1766).
40 Bland, An Inquiry into the Rights, 7-8.
41 See Peter Laslett’s introduction to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government.
42 Joseph Emerson, A Thanksgiving-Sermon preach’d at Pepperall, 9-10.
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of 1765 was similar to the resistance in 1689.43 Americans could thus appeal to
the revolution that Locke helped justify, making the linkage of Lockean and
historical arguments seem quite natural.
Moses Mather presented his defense of resistance “to an impartial world;
to whom, (under God) we make our appeal.”44 The next two pages of his pam-
phlet present a succinct Lockean theory in which God is the source of both
reason and freedom. Since each man has a property in himself that is initially
subject to God alone, property can only be taken by consent. Each person has a
natural right to “personal security, liberty, and private property.”45 These open-
ing pages serve as a theoretical background for a much longer section that made
arguments from legal materials and the writings of Blackstone. After arguing
that the colonial charters were binding on parliament, he argued that altering
the legislative power in violation of these charters justified resistance. He as-
sured the colonists that God’s vengeance would be poured out on America’s
enemies. His appendix contains other Lockean themes. He claims that liberty
and freedom are related to reason and opposed to licentiousness and the pas-
sions and that the people institute government for the protection of their natural
rights.46
When the writers turned to the common law, they of course emphasized
those aspects of the law that were most favorable to their case. I concur with
Zuckert’s claim that the colonists often reinterpreted the legal materials in the
light of a Lockean theory. The actual legal precedents were less congenial to
revolution than the colonists claimed that they were.47 Often their strongest
case was to claim that Lockean principles like the right of consent were also
legal, historical rights. Bland appealed to the colonial charters as evidence that
the colonists had become free when they immigrated and that they were there-
fore free to negotiate with the King whatever sort of governing arrangement
they desired.48 Again, legal arguments (whatever we may think of their plausi-
bility) are presented as corresponding in content to Lockean political theory.
The Lockean, Biblical, and legal/historical justifications for resistance thus
represent overlapping but distinct modes of argument. “Distinct mode of argu-
ment” refers to differences in reasons rather than differences in conclusions.
An appeal to history is different than an appeal to the Bible, although there is
no necessary reason why these two types of argument could not come to the
same conclusion in many instances. The appeal to Lockean political theory
rests on grounds that are different than direct appeals to tradition or the Bible.
43 Ibid., 27, 29.
44 Mather, America’s Appeal to the Impartial World, 4.
45 Ibid., 5-6
46 Ibid., 65.
47 Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, 99-101.
48 Bland, An Inquiry into the Rights, 15-20.
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The most controversial question has to do with the relationship of Lockean
arguments to republican ones. John Pocock draws on Gordon Wood’s charac-
terization of the revolutionary movement as largely republican to claim that we
should emphasize Machiavelli at the expense of Locke. But when we actually
look at the revolutionary writers, we do not generally find a group of Lockeans
pitted against a group of republicans. Instead, we find arguments of both types
frequently occurring in the same pamphlet. One explanation is that the colo-
nists mustered every argument that supported revolution without worrying much
whether they were logically consistent with one another or not. While there is
some truth to this, it is not the whole truth. If we are precise about what each
tradition states and implies, the fact that the two modes of argument were used
by the same writers becomes much easier to understand.
What do we mean by republicanism? Trying to actually distinguish Lockean
and republican themes is in practice rather complex. Ronald Hamowy charac-
terizes republicanism as emphasizing “the singular importance of the civic vir-
tues and of active participation in public life. It is associated with a distrust of
commerce and an aversion to the marketplace, a preference for landed wealth
and for agrarian values, a preoccupation with questions of political morality
and corruption, and a propensity to couch political debate in the language of
the ancient constitution rather than in terms of abstract rights.”49 If we ask
which writers are to be placed in this tradition, we find that the republican
tradition is capacious. The fact that Aristotle and Machiavelli are alternatively
put forward as the paradigm republican theorist is itself a strong indication of
just how capacious a tradition it is. If one simply contrasts Locke’s Two Trea-
tises and Machiavelli’s Discourses the contrast seems clear enough. But as one
moves away from Machiavelli and the Italian city states toward British writers
like Algernon Sidney, James Harrington, John Trenchard, and Thomas Gor-
don, the distinction between liberals and republicans begins to blur. Quentin
Skinner describes the significant changes that republican, “neo-roman,” writ-
ers in the seventeenth century made in the Machiavellian tradition in Liberty
before Liberalism.50 Most of these writers accepted schemes of representation
that seriously constrained the opportunities for the average citizen to exercise
political virtue. In many ways they actually provide a transition to Locke.
For example, Sidney, a contemporary of Locke’s often grouped with the
republicans, wrote: “Those multitudes that enter into such contracts, and there-
upon enter civil society, act according to their own will: Those that are engaged
in none, take their authority from the Law of Nature; their Rights cannot be
limited or diminished by any one man, or number of men; and consequently
whoever does it, or attempts the doing of it, violates the most sacred laws of
49 Hamowy, “Cato’s Letters, John Locke and the Republican Paradigm,” 273.
50 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), 17-36.
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God and Nature.”51 One could mistake this sentence for Locke, never for
Machiavelli. There is considerable debate as to whether any of these writers are
really “republican” in a non-Lockean sense at all.52 Part of what makes
Machiavelli’s thought different is the absence of natural rights, a state of na-
ture, and a social contract. If one compares Locke to these other writers, the
difference is not as stark. In sum, the language of contract and natural rights
does not dominate Sidney’s thought any more than the language of corruption
dominates Locke’s, yet both are present in each author. It should not be surpris-
ing, then, if the two are used together a century later.
It is not just that there are Lockean themes in the later republican writers; it
is also that many of the republican themes are either present in or easily recon-
cilable with Locke’s own philosophy. If we look at the areas where Lockean
discourse is normally contrasted with republican discourse, the contrast is not
as sharp as one might think. First, consider the differences between liberal and
republican concepts of liberty. It is telling that Skinner in Liberty before Liber-
alism chooses Hobbes rather than Locke as the spokesman for liberalism. Since
Hobbes’s thought is far less congenial to republicanism, Skinner’s move allows
for a striking contrast, but the contrast is misleading to the extent that Locke’s
rather than Hobbes’s version of liberalism was the more historically influen-
tial.53 In the case of the American colonists there was no contest, since Hobbes
was the last person someone advocating revolution would want to invoke.
Hobbes is the archetype proto-liberal with his claim that to be unfree is to be
forced or restrained. For republicans the opposite term of freedom is not con-
straint but slavery, and to be a slave is to be subject to the will of another.54
When we see colonists complain that to be subject to a parliament in which
they are not represented is a state of slavery, it is easy to read this as a rejection
of the liberal (Hobbesian) view of liberty. This contrast does not hold up well
with respect to Locke. He himself decried Filmer by comparing subjection to
the arbitrary will of the monarch to slavery in the opening pages of the Two
Treatises. His definition of liberty, moreover, is not the Hobbesian one. Ac-
cording to Locke, coercive threats as well as physical restraint can limit free-
dom. To be free involves not being dependent on the arbitrary will of another.
Locke describes a state of freedom as one where persons may “order their Ac-
tions, and dispose of their possessions, and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will
51 Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government (New York, 1979), 81.
52 See Hamowy, “Cato’s Letters, John Locke and the Republican Paradigm,” 273-94; Huyler,
Locke in America, 224-30; and Alan Craig Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heri-
tage in England and America (Princeton, 1991).
53 Blair Worden, “Factory of the Revolution,” London Review of Books, 5 February 1998,
13-15.
54 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 71-72.
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of any other Man.”55 Americans understood that Lockean liberty was not a
right to do whatever one wants but to act within clear moral constraints.56 More-
over, Locke did not think it a restriction on one’s liberty if public opinion pres-
sured someone into behaving in accordance with natural law. A writer who
equates liberty with not being dependent on the will of another, or who thinks
liberty should be limited by social pressure to comply with moral principles, is
not necessarily rejecting Locke.
Second, consider the republican themes of virtue and corruption. The pam-
phleteers did invoke these themes and used them to promote a mindset that
viewed Britain as increasingly corrupt and greater virtue as a prerequisite for
the restoration of liberty.57 This does not prove that critics of corruption were
rejecting Locke, however, because Locke also discussed corruption and be-
lieved that it could ultimately lead to the dissolution of government. For Locke,
widespread corruption was itself evidence that the government had betrayed
the people’s trust.58 His writings on education gave a prominent role to virtue
and he recommended Cicero to students interested in ethics.59 Since being a
Lockean does not make one a supporter of corruption, one cannot infer a rejec-
tion of Locke from the presence of such rhetoric. The colonists may have per-
ceived a difference of emphasis rather than a tension.
Third, one might try to bring out a contrast between those theories that
emphasize a respect for individual rights and those that would sacrifice indi-
vidual rights to the public good. The emphasis on the public good might be
republican or, following Shain, reformed Protestant.60 Once again, the contrast
is not as simple as one might think. Locke repeatedly claims that a government
breaches its trust if it uses its power for anything other than the public good.61
In the Two Treatises Locke never explicitly considered the possibility that the
protection of individual rights and the promotion of the public good might be
in conflict. On the contrary he seems most concerned with instances where the
people as a whole are deprived of rights, an occurrence Locke thought obvi-
ously contrary to the public good. Gordon Wood’s portrait of American think-
ers in 1776 is equally true of Locke: the tendency was to view the people as a
collective whole with a single interest and not to worry much about the possi-
bility of a majority faction oppressing minorities through democratic power.62
55 Two Treatises of Government, 2.4.
56 Barry Shain, The Myth of American Individualism, 119-20.
57 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 506-7.
58 Two Treatises of Government, 2.128, 158, 222, 223.
59 Ibid., 222; Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education. ed. John W. and Jean S. Yolton
(Oxford, 1989), 18-23.
60 The Myth of American Individualism, Ch. 1.
61 Two Treatises of Government, 2.3, 135, 142, 158, 160, 164-66, 199, 200, 215, 222, 229,
239.
62 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York, 1972), 53-65.
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If Locke, a more rigorous thinker than the average American pamphleteer, failed
to sense a tension, it is not surprising that later thinkers did not either. They
were more likely to see the protection of rights as one aspect of the public good
than as something in competition with it.
Fourth, consider the questions of wealth and commerce. Wood emphasizes
the hostility of Americans to luxury and their preference for a simple, virtuous
lifestyle.63 Locke, on the other hand, is thought to be the apologist for capital-
ism and the pursuit of self-interest. There are a number of problems with this
contrast. First, it relies heavily on an ahistorical portrait of Locke made famous
by C. B. Macpherson, who presented Locke as the apologist for unlimited per-
sonal accumulation and the critic of any claims that wealth carried with it so-
cial responsibility.64 The influential interpretations of Locke by Dunn, James
Tully, and others have cast serious doubt on this portrait of Locke.65 Locke’s
theory of natural law created an obligation to support those in desperate need,
and many of his practical proposals allowed the government to regulate prop-
erty rights for the common good. The most persuasive reconstruction of
Macpherson’s thesis that Locke is an apologist for capitalism is Neal Wood’s,
which argues that Macpherson’s mistake was in associating Locke with mod-
ern industrial capitalism; instead, the appropriate context is the enclosure move-
ment in England where agriculture was established on a capitalist basis as the
traditional land rights of commoners gave way to single proprietorships.66 As
Wood notes, almost all of Locke’s examples are agricultural not industrial in
their nature. Even his examples of commerce are normally trade between agri-
cultural producers.
These considerations go a long way toward explaining why Locke was not
seen as a foe by those who supported virtuous agriculture over luxurious com-
merce. Locke’s thought was useful as a defense of the appropriation of land by
individual proprietors at the expense of the Native American inhabitants who,
according to Locke’s thought, had left the land “waste.”67 Because there were
no existing feudal arrangements, it was easy for American agricultural land to
be owned by individual proprietors who were free to hire wage laborers and
sell their product as they chose. It is true that after the Revolutionary War was
over political tensions between agricultural and manufacturing interests be-
came politically salient, but there is little evidence that the colonists would
have read Locke as favoring the latter over the former. Locke’s fervent praise of
63 Wood, American Republic, 107-18.
64 C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(Oxford, 1962).
65 See John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1969); and James
Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980).
66 Neal Wood, John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism (Berkeley, 1984).
67 Barbara Arneil, John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism (Oxford,
1996).
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hard work and avoiding spoilage could easily be read as consistent with the
colonists’ concerns about luxury. Most of them would have distinguished be-
tween living “comfortably” and living “luxuriously” and found Locke’s thought
amenable in that respect.
In effect, much republican rhetoric could exist within a Lockean frame-
work. The place where the distinction between Lockean and republican themes
holds up best is in the theory of representation. If meaningful distinctions can
be drawn between Locke on the one hand and the tradition of classical republi-
canism and its Machiavellian rebirth on the other, one is certainly the distinc-
tion between politics as a “trust” and man as a “political animal.”68 Pocock
writes that “republican humanism, which was fundamentally concerned with
the affirmation of moral personality in civic action, had cause to ask whether
the concept of representation did not exclude that of virtue.” He also notes that
in classical republicanism “the zoon politikon, the being naturally civic must
act immediately and in his own person.”69 In the republican tradition political
virtue is the highest form of virtue, and preservation of liberty requires direct,
personal, and active involvement in political life. Because politics is a trust in
Locke’s theory, active personal participation in politics is not required, except
in the rare circumstances when the trust is dissolved. It is not less virtuous, in
the Lockean scheme, to entrust political power to a representative and engage
in other forms of productive labor and study. Although Locke agrees with the
republicans that liberty requires that one not be dependent on the will of an-
other, he claimed that such a conception of liberty is compatible with a politics
of trust in which the people can intervene when the trust is broken. Even on the
issue of representation the distinction between Locke and later republican writers
is unclear. It is important to remember that government by consent of the ma-
jority plays an important role not only in Locke’s thought but also in the thought
of the seventeenth century neo-Roman writers like Sidney and Harrington.70
In addition to the idea of government as a trust, a number of related Lockean
themes, such as natural right and the state of nature, were important to the
Revolutionary vocabulary of resistance, yet alien to republicanism in its Re-
naissance and classical forms. Again, many of these themes are present in “re-
publican” writers prior to Locke, making the traditions difficult to distinguish.
Still, a civic republicanism that includes natural rights, a state of nature, and
that emphasizes representation rather than direct participation is one that has
been significantly modified in a Lockean direction. Although not all of these
phrases or concepts are exclusive to Locke, together they do suggest a body of
thought that can be called “Lockean” in a way useful for the sake of compari-
68 On Locke and “trust” see John Dunn, “The Concept of Trust in the Politics of John
Locke,” Philosophy in History, ed. Richard Rorty et al. (Cambridge, 1984).
69 J. G. A. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 518.
70 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 27-29.
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son. These phrases set out a mode of argument and a vocabulary distinct from
that of the Machiavellian tradition.
The best and most developed example of republican discourse in the pam-
phlets I surveyed is probably John Dickinson’s “Letters from a Farmer in Penn-
sylvania, (1768)” aimed at the Townsend Acts. His persistent theme was that
taxation without the consent of the people or their representatives is illegiti-
mate. Unlike Locke, he does not ground this principle in abstract rights or natu-
ral law but instead appeals to history and the traditional rights of Americans as
British subjects. He quotes extensively from the English statutes as well as the
writings of Coke to defend the idea that England had the right to levy taxes on
the colonies only for the purpose of regulation of trade and not simply to gener-
ate revenue.71 The legal arguments are so prominent that he could easily be put
in that category as well. Dickinson was widely read and quoted many different
sources. His writings are filled with quotations from classical writers as well as
Machiavelli and Cato’s Letters. There is a pervading sense that liberty is fragile
and that the people must be ever vigilant to check every attempt at usurpation
by the government. He worried about the threat standing armies posed to lib-
erty. Most of all he was concerned that Americans would simply accept the tax
because the amount was small and thereby set a precedent for future encroach-
ments.72
Despite the absence of Lockean themes and the predominance of republi-
can themes, Dickinson did not see Locke as a hostile writer. He was so enam-
ored by the following speech of Lord Camden that he presents the quotation
twice (once in part and once in full) in the same letter:
My position is this—I repeat it—I will maintain it to my last hour—
Taxation and representation are inseparable. This position is [f]ounded
on the laws of nature; it is more, it is itself an eternal law of nature; for
whatever is a man’s own, is absolutely his own; and no man hath a right
to take it from him without his consent, either expressed by himself or
representative.... “The forefathers of the Americans did not leave their
native country, and subject themselves to every danger and distress, to
be reduced to the state of slavery. They did not give up their rights;
they looked for protection, and not for chains, from their mother-coun-
try. By her they expected to be defended in the possession of their
property; and not to be deprived of it: For should the present power
continue, there is nothing which they can call their own, or, to use the
words of Mr. Locke, what property have they in that, which another
may, by right, take, when he pleases, to him self.”73
71 Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania ... (Philadelphia, 1768; New York,
1903), 13-26.
72 Ibid., 118-31.
73 Ibid., 77-78.
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Dickinson then wrote, “It is impossible to read this speech and Mr. Pitt’s [not
quoted here], and not be charmed with the generous zeal for the rights of man-
kind, that glows in every sentence.”
Dickinson’s Letters emphasize themes more associated with republican-
ism than with Locke. He discusses virtue and standing armies; he argues in
terms of history rather than abstract natural rights. But it is dangerous to draw
a distinction based on what a writer does not say. His admiration for Camden’s
position strongly implies that he saw claims of natural right as legitimate and
relevant, even if they were not the focus of his own writings. He could see
Locke as compatible for the reasons we discussed above: Locke was willing to
describe liberty as not being dependent on the will of another and to describe
those who were so dependent, particularly in the disposition of their property,
as slaves. Moreover Dickinson, like Locke, accepted representation as an ad-
equate substitute for regular direct participation in government. He repeatedly
stresses that consent to taxation by one’s representatives is adequate. His role
for popular participation is sporadic. The people must keep a careful watch on
those they have entrusted power to as representatives and must oppose them if
they overstep their bounds. This is precisely Locke’s notion of political partici-
pation. The people must always be ready to oppose the government when it
oversteps its commission, but they need not be personally present in the assem-
bly itself. Dickinson also believed that while resistance was in principle legiti-
mate in such cases, violent resistance should be used rarely. In fact he was not
an enthusiastic supporter of the revolution when it did eventually occur.
 Taking the set of pamphlets as a whole, there is a significant and compre-
hensive use of Lockean ideas as well as a significant intermingling of those
ideas with other complementary modes of argument. In some of the writers,
like Bland and Otis, Lockean arguments are dominant. For writers like Warren
and Dickinson they receive less emphasis even though they are present. Even
in those writers who were most Lockean, there are always historical or biblical
arguments invoked to supplement the position. The portrait of the revolution-
ary writers as simply Lockean is indeed too simple; there were a variety of
discourses available. Combining modes of discourse was the norm. The fact
that Locke’s thought could serve as a justification for resistance while being
compatible with diverse other forms of arguments is an important reason for
Locke’s prominence in revolutionary thought.
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